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Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign
Aid. By Kimber Charles Pearce. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press,
2001; pp. x + 173. $35.95.

In Rostow, Kennedy, and the Rhetoric of Foreign Aid, Kimber Charles Pearce has provided an interesting and detailed account
that meets the reader at a number of important intersections implicating a bevy of com-

pelling relationships, including but not limited to social science and public policy,
rhetoric and history, rh etoric and economics, influential rhetoric on the presidency
and a number of presidential administrations, and cold war decision-making and foreign policy. Moreover, Pearce employs a
case study that documents an important program: John F. Kennedy's Alliance for
Progress. As a result, much is accomplished,
rouch of it original, and all in a rather economical 121 pages (excluding endnotes and
references).

BOOK REVIEWS

Chapter I: "From the Academy to the
White House: Rostow, Foreign Aid, and Social Scientific Advocacy," provides us with a
brief biography of Rostow and a record of
his government service. Rostow would distinguish himself as a Rhodes scholar at Oxford University, complete a Ph .D. in economic history at Yale, and serve during
World War II at the State Department and at
the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Rostow returned from the war intent on further
establishing his academic and public policy
career. He joined his friend and former CIA
employee Max F. Millikan to co-found the
Center for International Studies (CENIS) at
MIT. The center's mission focused on developing a "world economic plan in U.S. foreign poliCY" (p. 13). While CENIS was assisted by some major foundations, it also
received funding from the CIA. In Pearce's
account, it is a somewhat minor disappointment that the relationship between the CIA
and CENIS is largely unexplored. What becomes clear is that Rostow and his associates
became convinced that the "gap" between
the rich and the poor was a destabilizing
force in world politics and that attention to
this matter was critical. Rostow was intent
upon convincing President Eisenhower of
his views. Between 1956 and 1959, Rostow
testified three times before Congress, outlining his views on the Soviets, economic development, and U.S. foreign policy issues.
During the same period Rostow met with
John F. Kennedy, who served on the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. Rostow was
particularly instrumental in advising Kennedy
on economic aid to India, even drafting
some of th e senator's speeches. Such influence would carry over into later years. During the 1960 campaign, for example,
Kennedy employed principles drawn from
The Stages of Economic Growth to distinguish himself from his opponents on the
question of foreign aid. Rostow worked
closely with Kennedy during the campaign
and throughout Kennedy's preSidency
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where he worked on instituting the Alliance
for Progress, sat in on discussions on the Bay
of ~igs fiasco, and served on the president's
Policy Planning Council at the Department
of State. Later, Rostow was appointed by
Lyndon Johnson to the Inter-American
Committee for the Alliance for Progress
(CLAP) and later as National Security Adviser.
Given this brief introduction Pearce turns
to Chapter 2: "Theory, Countertheory, and
Rostow's Pursuit of Academic Novelty: The
Process of Economic Growth." Herein,
Pearce interrogates Rostovian intellectual
foundations. The post-World War II environment was fertile ground for the renaissance of the study of economic development. It also provided a platform for
Rostow's challenge to the neoclassicists. Rostow's analysis of the new economic situation
was perfectly compatible with the newly reformulated cold war environment. Pearce
explains how and why this was the case.
Rostow's historical vision of macroeconomics was soon enveloping its creator in a
"seamless web" of policy formation (p. 33).
Pearce outlines key proof texts of the Rostovian argument such as those contained in
The Process of Economic Growth. Professor
Pearce judiCiously and deftly brings out Rostow's anti-Marxism, his notions of human
motivation, and his analytic dependence on
the British industrial revolution as irrefutable
evidence demonstrating the power of his
macro analysiS and "six societal propensities
for capitalistic growth." These Rostovian
prescriptions fit right in with ethnocentric
Western Cold War ideology by predicting
the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy
and providing yet another vehicle to convey
a virulent anticommunism. This was welcomed in its time by presidents and publics
alike.
In Chapter 3: "Ideas in Action: A Proposal: Key to Effective Foreign Policy,"
Pearce turns to Rostow's attempts at influence during the Eisenhower era. Rostow's

concept of modernization and development
aid looked beyond political alliances and
military pacts such as the NATO alliance.
For Rostow, events such as the Suez crisis in
Egypt in 1956 underscored the need for
change in Eisenhower's policies regarding
global communism. Pearce describes the
Princeton Inn Conference of 1954 to delineate how rhetorical invention occurs in foreign aid policy discussions. He then turns to
a pivotal book developed out of that conference by Rostow and Millikan, published as A
Proposal: Key to Effictive Foreign Policy, which
highlighted a new foreign policy thesis that
focused on the "non-aligned" nations in Africa, Asia, Central America, and the Middle
East. The key to a new, effective foreign
policy, the authors argued, was economic
rather than military. Development aid would
assist the United States to fulfill its mission- "a mission to see the prinCiples of national independence and human liberty extended on the world scene" (p. 64). Rostow
felt that his theory, when applied to public
policy, could achieve a "peaceful revolution"
through a balanced "diffusion" of power.
Rostow seems to have had a modicum of
success with the Eisenhower administration.
Pearce points to a "small" Development
Loan Fund (DLF) created in 1958 as well as
The International Development Associated
(IDA) and the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB), both of which were created in
1959.
Chapter 4: "Narrative Reason in Rostow's
Stages of Economic Growth: A Non Communist Manifesto" discusses the evolution of
and discursive strategies contained, in Rostow's "magnum opus" The Stages of Economic
Growth. The book combined history with
macroeconomics to describe five stages of
development that all nations eventually pass
through. These stages include: "the traditional SOCiety, the preconditions for take-off,
the take-uff, the drive to maturity, and the
age of high mass consumption" (p. 78).
Pearce's helpful analYSis refers to the stages

87
ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY

as a kind of "frame narrative" and he uncovers other "embedded narratives" in Rostow's
arguments for modernization. These narratives implicate human motivation, describe
cold war social organization, and employ the

"Buddenbrooks analogy," a reference to
Thomas Mann's novel Buddenhrooks, which
traces three generations of a merchant class

family. Using Mann's novel to secure comparative advantage in The SUIgtS of Economic
Growth, Rostow was able to employ the an alog to explain transformations in national
character and reinforce his notion of "diffusion of power." Rostow's Stages had garnered
him both national and international renown.

This book would also catapult him into service with both the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations.

Chapter 5: "Advocating the Alliance for
Progress: Rostow, Kennedy," and th e Rhet-

oric of Peaceful Revolution and Chapter 6:
"From Punta Del Este and Back: The Alliance Fades" are complementary and together constitute the book's primary rhetorical case study. By the time John F. Kennedy
took office in 196 1, the "Rostow Doctrine"
had fully emerged. It was determined that
Kennedy'S Alliance for Progress would be a
test site for application of Rostow's "modernization" principles to Latin America. "Economic diplomacy" was argued as th e best
road to capturing the minds and hearts of the
masses of people in the area. Despite concomitaot high-minded public discourse,
"Latin America had become a primary cold
war battleground" (p. 88) and the new Alliance was formed in part to counter Khrushchev's reported intention to conduct global
wars of national liberation. Threats to the
Western hemisphere were seen as best handled through "counterinsurgency" and
"peaceful revolution" spurred by economic
development. Rostow's influence in realizing
these policies is well-documented. Rostow's
hand can also be seen in Kennedy'S rhetorical campaign on behalf of the Alliance for
Progress. Pearce does a nice job of detailing
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that campaign and relies prinCipally on a
rhetorical analysis of arguments advanced in
four specific Kennedy addresses: theJanuary
20 Inaugural Address, the January 30 Annual Message to Congress, the March 13
Address at a Reception for Members of Congress and the Latin Diplomatic Corp (where
JFK introduced his plans for the Alliance)
and a Special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid, March 22, 1961. Interestingly,
Pearce maintains that the sum total of this
rhetorical foray yielded "mixed messages"
that to "a great degree"(p. 99) reflected "inconsistencies in Rostow's economic theory"
(p. 100). In addition, after the Bay of Pigs
fiasco the inconsistencies between "counterinsurgency" and "peaceful revolution" were
laid bare and, as a resul~ Kennedy's Alliance
was largely "discredited." The fallout also
plagued the August 1961 Punta Del Este
meeting with OAS members. But the founding charter of the Alliance and some unrealistic operational stipulations also proved
vexing for Latin Americans.
After military coups in the Dominican Republic and Honduras, the handwriting was
on the wall, the Alliance was fading. After
Kennedy's assassination, it fell to the Johnson administration to revive it. Thomas
Mann received a new appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs and this was interpreted by some "as
the definitive end of the Alliance program"
(p. 109). By 1966, Rostow had assumed the
position of national security adviser. In the
LBJ years Rostow had shifted his position to
promote private sector investment as the
best route to modernization in Latin America. Nevertheless, the Alliance had become
an important symbol and LBJ, partially in an
attempt to divert attention from his growing
dilemma in Vietnam, helped publicize the
second Punta Del Este meeting in April of
1967. Six months later Rostow feebly reported that the results were "not dramatic"
and blamed lackluster Congressional appropriations (p. 114). Pearce concludes that
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while "Roslow's stages of growth model was
a persuasive instrument of social scientific
and political advocacy, its totalizing assessment of the economic evolution of developing countries could not be converted into an
operational form generalizable from nation
to nation" (p. 115).
Pearce has crafted an excellent book; it is
well-researched and well-documented and
demonstrates judicious use of archival materials. Pearce provides an interesting history
and an insightful rhetorical analysis. In short,
this is a fine example of rhetorical history.
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